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Faculty and Deans

COMMENTARY

w.

TAYLOR REVELEY,

III * .

My views have shifted notably as to the proper allocation of power
between the President and Congress regarding the use of military
force abroad. Upon leaving college, I was reasonably certain that the
perils of the times in which we live, and the institutional advantages of
the President over Congress as a decision-maker, necessitated that he
make our basic foreign policy decisions, both the peaceful and the warlike. About all Congress could do was to accept this necessity gracefully. While in Law School, I had an opportunity to study the question in
some detail, and came to the conclusion that though the President had a
prerogative to initiate policy, and to implement it as he wished, Congress
might legitimately call him short at any time, and force policies upon him.
Further study has suggested that Congress is constitutionally entitled
to an even greater role in the determination of American foreign policy,
particularly when it involves the use of armed force.•
Now obviously, as Mr. Belman pointed out, Congress cannot be
involved in the day-to-day execution of our various external policies.
But it can have a positive influence on the policies which the executive
branch implements. The appropriate Congressional role includes-but
goes beyond-a voice in the decisions which actually rlispatch or withhold the troops. A say in these decisions alone would generally give the
legislators little real influence on the course of events. When the President finally uses force as an ultimate instrument of diplomacy, he most
often does so out of desperation, under pressures which would bear
equally on Congressmen. Therefore, if the Congressmen are to have an
effective role in determining when we will and when we will not use the
military, they must have a prior voice in shaping the foreign policy which
forms the context of later decisions.
Greater congressional influence would not necessarily reduce the number of wars. The President, on the whole, makes wiser foreign policy
decisions than Congress; he is institutionally better able to do so. Further,
there is no reason to think that Congress is fundamentally more
pacific than the President. One recent notable instance in which the
militancy of the legislators exceeded that of the Executive occurred
during the Cuban Missile Crisis; some Congressional leaders would
have preferred to bomb rather than blockade. On the other hand, it
is probably true that greater congressional participation would not involve us in more wars. Whereas it is relatively easy for the President to
use the military despite a reluctant Congress, it would be very difficult for Congress, in turn, to force a reluctant Executive to take military
action of which he disapproves, as President Kennedy demonstrated
during the Missile Crisis. Some restraint would be inherent in the
• A.B., Princeton University, 1965; LL.B., University of Virginia, 1968.
1. See generally Reveley, Presidential Warmaking: Constitutional Prerogative or Usurpa-

tion?, 55 VA. L. REv. 1243 (1969).
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process of consultation and deliberation that would emerge were Congress, as well as the President, to have a substantive \'Oice in shaping
American foreign policy.
Perhaps the greatest merit in the establishment of a larger role for
Congress, however, is the constitutional legitimacy it would bestow upon the use of force. Most Americans (those, in any event, who have an
opinion on the matter) think that the Constitution gives legislators a
strong voice in decisions about American entry into war. Accordingly, when Congress has no meaningful say in the initiation of a conflict,
two regrettable consequences result. First, the American involvement
lacks much of the political backing essential to its continuance if
the fighting proves to be longlasting. The way is open domestically to
internecine struggle over the merits of American participation-a struggle
likely to force withdrawal too soon to realize the goals of the hawks and
too late to effect those of the doves.
Second, and perhaps more fundamentally, the rule of law within this
country is measurably discredited when the President acts, or appears
to act, iri an unconstitutional manner. His willingness to initiate hostilities without the prior and express approval of Congress conflicts directly
with popular notions that the Constitution necessitates such approval.
The viability of our governmental system depends largely upon voluntary obedience to the law. The President and Congress-he through his
willingness to act unilaterally and the legislators through their willingness to be bypassed-have set a very poor example; their relaxed approach
to the pertinent dictates of the Constitution is particularly invidious
in a time when voluntary obedience to the law is under serious challenge
on a number of fronts.
Even the strongest supporters of presidential hegemony over American foreign policy would probably agree that greater congressional participation in the shaping of foreign policy would have
certain advantages; but they argue that the potential costs of such
participation would be greater. Today, the need for quick, flexible,
expert, informed, and frequently secret decision-making is highly regarded; Congress as an institution is said to be at best inefficient
and at worst dangerous as an active participant in the decision-making which shapes American foreign policy. But it seems that with a few
changes in its procedures and with a major reformation in its willpower, Congress could adjust its decision-making processes to meet the
demands of the times. Moreover, there is question as to what extent
secrecy and expertise are crucial to the decisions in question. With the
possible exception of Korea, Cold War crises have not required so hasty
a commitment of American troops abroad as to preclude congr£'ssional
participation in the decision to dispatch them. Similarly, with the
possible exception of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the initial plannin~ of
the American response need not have taken place in such strict secrecy as to preclude congressional participation. And while expertise
is helpful in identification of possible courses of action and the likely
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possible courses of action and the likel~· consequences of each, it is not
particularly helpful in making the inherently political value
judgements as to whether or not the objective in question is worth the
price of war.
Even should these institutional arguments against a greater
Congressional role be overcome, supporters of presidential control
may still question the legislators' competence on another score: Their
judgment. There exists a fear, stemming in good part from ill-advised
congressional policies during the years between the two World Wars,
that the legislators would make decisions detrimental to national
security. No doubt that danger exists, though it is imP,ortant to
remember that fallibility does not grace solely the legislative branch.
Moreover, if any branch of government persists in making decisions
unresponsive to the needs of the times, it will find its authority
circumvented, as was the case with Congress at the hands of Franklin
Roosevelt during the late 1930's. The likelihood of such legislative
myopia today, however, is not great.
I have suggested the existence of widespread expectations that when
the United States has a choice whether or not to go to war-that is,
when hostilities are not thrust upon us by an attack directly
threatening American territorial integrity-Congress must approve
our involvement, or the Constitution will be violated. These
expectations are well-founded. Admittedly when you look at the
relevant constitutional provisions in Articles I and II, the language is
ambiguous: Terms susceptible of many meanings are often used:
conflicting grants of power are made to the President and Congress.
Ambiguity admitted, however, the fact remains that in terms of expre~s grants of power over the shaping of foreign policy, especially
belligerent foreign policy Congress emerges well ahead of the President.
The intent of the Framers confirms the indication inherent in the
Constitution's language that Congress is to have a meaningful voice in
thE> determination of foreign policy. It seems clear that the Framers
intended that both houses of Congress, with presidential advice, no
doubt, and subject to executive approval or veto, to decide whether the
goals sought are worth the likely consequences of resort to military
force. By so involving Congress and the President, the Framers hoped
to avoid both hasty, ill-conceived wars and wars devoid of the requisite
national backing. Precedent during the early years of the Republic-a
time when many of the Framers· were still active in public
affairs--suggests that their definition of war was extremely broad,
including very limited conflicts which involved no formal declaration
of war (such as the Naval War with France of 1798-1800), as well as
more comprehensive, formally proclaimed struggles (for example, the
Warof1812).
The meaning to be given the language in the Constitution is not
confined to the intent of the Framers when they wrote the document or
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when they gave content to its provisions by their own conduct in the
new government. To remain functional the Constitution has, and
must, evolve to meet the changing needs of the country. When,
however, the Framers' language and intent seem clearly to compel a
certain political process, when that process is not adverse to the needs
of the times, and when strong popular belief exists that the process is
constitutionally required, then it should be honored. Applying these
criteria to Articles I and II, I find they grant Congress a larger role in
decisions to commit American troops abroad than it has exercised during the last twenty-five years.
What of the argument that significant congressional involvement is
no longer required, at least as a matter of Constitutional law, because
the Consitution has been amended by usage to permit unilateral
presidential war-making? Unquestionably presidential practice before
the Second World War and during the Cold War provides precedent
for a wide-ranging executive writ. And unquestionably, this practice has
bred expectations that the President is constitutionally entitled to act
broadly to defend the country.
But these expectations have not displaced in most people's thinking
the more longstanding view that the President should seek Congressional counsel and approval before initiating hostilities abroad. There
is ample precedent prior to the Cold War supporting this conclusion.
With the exception of President Polk's fait accompli in the Mexican War
(a bit of presidential warmaking which th~ House of Representatives censured as unconstitutional by a close. vote in 1848),2 there was in general
collaboration during the nineteenth ce~tury between the President and
Congress regarding the use of force abroad. Virtually all Executives of this
period felt constitutionally bound to seek congressional approval before
initiating hostilities. During the first forty years of the twentieth century,
congressional influence over American foreign policy remained strong,
as in the Neutrality Acts of the 1930's.3 Unfortunately the pernicious
nature of much of that influence forced the more far-sighted Presidents
of the era, Franklin Roosevelt in particular, to circumvent the legislators
by fair means or foul.
As to the unilateral Presidential acts of the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, most of them have little or no relevance to the
present situation. The Presidents acting in those instances acted
under circumstances wholly unlike those of today; accordingly, their
conduct cannot be used to justify the activities of contemporary
Executives. In any event the bulk of the incidents cited, especially
those of the nineteenth century, were so minute in effort and impact as
to pose no threat to congressional war powers. This, admittedly, was
not the case with many instances of unilateral intervention by the
2. CoNG. Gt.oiE, 30th Cong. 1st Sess. 95 (1848), cited in Reveley, supra 1, at
1260 n.48.
3. Ch. 837, 49 Stat. 1081 (1935); ch. 146, 50 Stat. 121 (1937); ch. 2, 54 Stat. 4 (1939).
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President in Latin states during the first three decades of the
twentieth century.
But even such presidential war-making took place under
circumstances in which it was relatively easy to predict the
consequences of the use of force, and in which the risk of escalation
was largely non-existent. Moreover the incidents in question,
particularly during the nineteenth century, occurred in an era when
the United States had made no commitments to defend some states
and to contain others. Thus it was virtually impossible for a President to present Congress with a situation in which it felt compelled
to support his action, Jest the credibility of our commitments be
doubted and our defense posture weakened. In any event, had a nineteenth, and to some extent an early twentieth, century President
wished to embark upon significant military efforts abroad without
Congressional approval, he would have been hard-pressed to do so,
as the standing military establishment was modest in the extreme. To
raise the requisite troops, he would have had to seek congressional
authorization. Finally, even when the incidents in question did not
involve such minutia as the· pursuit of pirates or small naval landings
to protect American citizens or property from mob violence, they
consisted principally of interferences with the affairs of backward,
powerless states during an era which predated Article II of the U.N.
Charter.
Against this background, let me speak briefly on what I think the
President can do unilaterally. First, it seems clear that he is dutybound to respond immediately when United States territory is physically attacked, or is in imminent danger of attack. In such a situation, the decision whether or not the United States will fight has been
made by the attacking power. Conflict has been thrust upon us, and to
this extent congressional authorization of hostilities becomes superfluous. The President's response, however, should be proportionate
to the attack. Once he has utterly repelled it, he should not then himself, without congressional authorization, go on the offensive. For example, if enemy submarines were to shell with conventional ordinance a few
coastal cities, the President would not have discretion to unleash SAC
against the homeland of the attacking boats. But he would be free to sink
or capture all hostile vessels caught within striking distance of American
cities.
What of attacks on American security interests which do not involve
physical assault on United States territory? In these situations the
President is obligated to seek congressional authorization-if at all
possible-before he acts. It is true that American security interests are
worldwide now and that an attack need not be upon our territory to
threaten directly our national security. On the other hand, reasonable
men may disagree as to which foreign security interests are worth
fighting for, and to what extent we should commit our forces.
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Accordingly, as was the Framers' design, it is imperative that both
houses of Congress be involved in the decision to fight, lest the war be
hasty or ill-coneeived or lest it lack adequate political support. The
fact that a conflict is condoned by an international organization, as
was the Korean War, does not obviate the necessity for Congressional
approvaL The Korean conflict is the premier instance of unconstitutional executive war-making.
Should the President be faced with a sudden attack on an ally which
he feels must be repelled immediately, and should he believe that
Congress would willingly support American intervention, he is
constitutionally permitted to respond unilaterally, while at the same
time placing the matter before Congress and asking for ratification of
the action taken and for approval of further use of force. Or should the
President believe that the American response to an attack upon one of
our external security interests must be prepared in the greatest
secrecy and sprung suddenly upon the enemy if it is to be effective,
then he is entitled again to act first and seek congressional approval
after the fact. Admittedly in both situations he would present C.onJ!TPSs
with a fait accompl~ but his institutional advantages over Congress as
a quick, flexible, informed, and if necessary secret decision-maker,
and the nature of the times, neeessitate that Congress gracefully
accept this limitation on its powers. Presumably the legislators would
not be reluctant to do so if they had a meaningful role in the shaping of
American foreign policy and if they felt certain that the President
would not act unilaterally unless he felt it essential, and unless he
believed that Congress would willingly approve the measures taken.
What of attacks on American civilians or troops abroad? Obviously
any Americans assaulted while outside the United States are
permitted to defend themselves to the best of their ability. If they are in
international air space or waters, it seems that the President can
unilaterally do all in his power to defend them, just as he can repel
assaults on American territory. But if the Americans are attacked
within the territory of another state, the President should not send
forces to their aid if the step risks significant hostilities. For example,
the President could have done anything within his power to rescue the
Pueblo before the North Korean:, forced it into port. But once its
capture had been consummated, any attempt by the President to
recover the ship or its crew, or to retaliate against the attackers,
would have risked sizable hostilities with the North Koreans, and
therefore should not have been undertaken without congressional
approval. On the other hand, the joint 1965 effort by American and
Belgian forces to rescue whites under attack in the Congo by clements
beyond the control of the central government could be undertaken
unilaterally by the Executive without constitutional difficulty. Hostilities with another state were not involved, and there was no risk of largescale fighting. Needless to say, the speed and secrecy exceptions to
the necessity for prior congressional approval apply in this contP"'t as
well.
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As far as the peacetime deployment of American armed forces is concerned, the President has a broad prerogative to locate the troops as he
sees fit, so long as he does not thereby immediately precipitate hostilities. Presumably, however, the deployment will be in accord with basic
foreign policy objectives, which will have already been formulated with
the assistance and approval of Congress.
Let me make one final remark, which was implicit in several of my
earlier comments. To authorize the use of force abroad, I certainly do
not believe it necessary that Congress formally declare war. Any type
of affirmative indication by both houses that they approve the hostilities will suffice, though a joint resolution may be the best method
as it avoids the dangers inherent in a formal declaration, and yet still
speaks directly and singly to the question of the use of force. This resolution should be adopted only after Congress has adequately considered the situation and the proposed measure and its legislative history
should clearly indicate, at the least, the steps authorized and their objectives.

